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In the wake of the December 2012 school shooting in Newtown, Connecticut,
many Americans rapidly came to regard gun control as crucial to protecting our
children from violence.' Some of those who had previously seen little reason to
question an individual's right to possess firearms experienced doubt and
entertained a greater willingness to reconsider and modify their positions.2 Yes,
many thought, an individual has the right to self-protection and may be entitled to
own a firearm to that end, but there can and must be limits. 3 Responding to this
I See, e.g., Michael Cooper & Dalia Sussman, Massacre at School Sways Public in Way
Earlier Shootings Didn't, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 2013, at A16 ("Newtown, Conn., appears to be
profoundly swaying Americans' views on guns, galvanizing the broadest support for stricter gun laws
in about a decade, according to a New York Times/CBS News poll."); David Nakamura & Jon
Cohen, Most Support Gun Control: Guards at Schools Also Favored, Poll Finds Newtown Affected
Attitudes, WASH. PosT, Jan. 15, 2013, at Al ("More than half of Americans-52 percent in the poll-
say the shooting at an elementary school in Newtown, Conn., has made them more supportive of gun
control.").
2 After the shooting, for example, Representative John Yarmuth (D., KY) released a
statement calling for greater firearm regulation: "I have been largely silent on the issue of gun
violence over the past six years, and I am now as sorry for that as I am for what happened to the
families who lost so much in this most recent, but sadly not isolated, tragedy." Jeremy W. Peters,
Some Unlikely Democrats Join in Push for New Gun Laws, N.Y. TIMES, THE CAucus, Dec. 17, 2002,
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/renewed-and-some-new-support-for-gun-control/.
And Joseph Scarborough, former Republican Congressman and the host of MSNBC's "Morning
Joe," opened his broadcast following the Newtown shootings by stating:
I am a conservative Republican who received the NRA's highest ratings over 4 terms in
Congress. I saw this debate over guns as a powerful, symbolic struggle between
individual rights and government control . . . But I come to you this morning with a
heavy heart and no easy answers. Still, I have spent the past few days grasping for
solutions and struggling for answers, while daring to question my own long held beliefs
on these subjects . . . For the sake of my four children, and yours, I choose life and I
choose change. It's time to turn over the tables inside the temple, and for the sake of our
children, we must do what's right, and for the sake of this great nation that we love, let's
pray to God that we do.
Morning Joe: December 17, 2012 (MSNBC television broadcast Dec. 17, 2012).
See, e.g., Neil Heslin, whose six-year-old son was killed at Sandy Hook Elementary
School, testified at a hearing on gun laws in Connecticut that, as someone who grew up as a hunter
and a gun-enthusiast, he believed that the government should ban assault style weapons. Ray Rivera
& Peter Applebome, Sandy Hook Parents' Testimony to Legislature Reflects Divide on Guns, N.Y.
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change in public opinion, President Barack Obama vocally committed to making
both executive and legislative measures restricting access to the most lethal
firearms a priority for his second term.4
Meanwhile, as the nation seemed poised to move to the left on gun regulation,
the National Rifle Association (NRA) weighed in on the national conversation.
After a suspenseful few days of silence, NRA Executive Vice President and CEO
Wayne LaPierre held a press conference and there asserted, "the only thing that
stops a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun."5 Accordingly, LaPierre
argued that the proper response to the recent school shooting was to introduce
armed gunmen into schools so that a guard with the children's safety in mind could
use deadly force to protect them.6
The story of the Newtown shooting and the political fallout regarding gun
control is instructive well beyond the issue of guns. Most observers felt inspired
by the tragic events at Sandy Hook Elementary School to want to cut back on the
scope of an individual right that had manifestly placed innocent children in harm's
way.7 Some observers, however, had the opposite reaction. They saw constraints
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/nyregion/connecticut-
legislature-hearing-on-gun-violence.html?_r-0.
4 See, e.g., Meet The Press: December 30, 2012 (NBC television broadcast Dec. 30, 2012),
available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3032608/#50324240 ("I've been very clear that an assault
rifle ban, banning these high capacity clips, background checks, that there are a set of issues that I
have historically supported and will continue to support. And so the question is, 'Are we going to be
able to have a national conversation and move something through Congress?' I'd like to get it done
in the first year. I will put forward a very specific proposal based on the recommendations that Joe
Biden's task force is putting together as we speak. And so this is not something that I will be putting off.");
WHITE HOUSE, Press Release, Remarks by the President and the Vice President on Gun Violence (Jan. 16,
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/16/remarks-president-and-vice-
president-gun-violence (announcing twenty-three executive actions and calling for congressional
action to address gun violence).
s Wayne LaPierre, NRA Press Conference (Dec. 21, 2012) (emphasis omitted),
available at http://home.nra.org/pdf/TranscriptPDF.pdf. For video of LaPierre's comments
at the NRA's Dec. 21, 2012 press conference, see PBS News Hour, NRA's Wayne LaPierre
Calls for Armed Security in Every School, YouTUBE (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lgu9f-qdUo.
6 LaPierre, supra note 5 ("I call on Congress today to act immediately, to appropriate
whatever is necessary to put armed police officers in every single school-and to do it now, to make
sure that blanket of safety is in place when our children return to school in January. Before Congress
reconvenes, before we engage in any lengthy debate over legislation, regulation or anything else, as
soon as our kids return to school after the holiday break, we need to have every single school in
America immediately deploy a protection program, proven to work-and by that I mean armed
security.") (emphasis omitted).
In the aftermath of the shooting, 58% percent of Americans polled responded that laws on
gun sales should be made stricter, according to a USA Today/Gallup Poll. That number jumped from
the 43% of respondents who shared that same viewpoint in 2011. See Scott Clement, How Newtown
Changed Americans' Views on Guns (and How it Didn't), WASH. PosT, THE Fix, Dec. 28, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/12/28/how-newtown-changed-americans-
views-on-guns-and-how-it-didnt/.
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on the individual right to own a firearm as the villain in the story. The political
winds moved in the direction of restricting the individual right, reflecting the
majority's sentiment, but dissenters appeared emboldened rather than chastened by
the mass murder of children, and gun sales skyrocketed in anticipation of legal
restrictions.9 Eventually, a proposal to reinstate the federal assault-weapons ban
fizzled in Congress.
In their painstakingly researched and insightful book, Confessions of Guilt,
George C. Thomas III and Richard A. Leo tell us an illuminating and previously
untold story about a very different individual right-the right against compelled
self-incrimination. The story that Thomas and Leo tell gives us the tools to better
understand both the history of the Fifth Amendment right and battles over
individual entitlements more generally, including the right to bear arms.
By closely examining the Fifth Amendment's story in particular, Thomas and
Leo challenge an existing narrative that many of us have come to regard as the
official truth about coerced confessions. This conventional story has our nation
steadily progressing over time toward the shining beacon of Miranda v. Arizona.10
"Far from evolving in a more or less straight line to the shining hill of Miranda,"
however, the authors tell us that "the history of law regulating interrogation is
contingent and always in flux." (P. 167.)
It is the deep insights of Confessions of Guilt that led me to begin this review
with the story of the Newtown shooting and gun control. Though the political
alignments (and, correspondingly, the substance and merit of the relative rights
positions) differ, the story of an experienced threat and a reaction against
individual rights is the Thomas/Leo story of the Fifth Amendment. It is a tale of
competing reactions to life's contingencies rather than the story of a nation
growing up and becoming civilized."
In the days after the shootings, lawmakers in Oklahoma, Missouri, Minnesota, South
Dakota, and Oregon announced that they were willing to consider new legislation that would allow
teachers and school administrators to carry firearms in schools. Angela K. Brown, Texas Town
Allows Teachers to Carry Concealed Guns, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 2012 7:47 PM,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/20/texas-town-teachers-guns/I781663/.
9 In Connecticut, where the shooting took place, December 2012 gun sales were up 71% over
December 2011 gun sales. Sari Horwitz, Peter Finn & Brian Dowling. Gun Sales So Brisk, Shortages
Develop Increase Linked to Possible Bans, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 23, 2013, available at
http://www.courant.com/business/hc-gun-sales-20130118,0,2159069.story. When it released its
fiscal third-quarter earniigs, representing the quarter spanning the shooting and its aftermath, gun
maker Smith & Wesson Holdings Corp. had more than tripled its earnings from the same quarter the
previous year. Shan Li, Smith & Wesson Earnings More Than Triple as Demand for Guns Soars,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-smith-wesson-eamings-
20130306,0,6458306.story.
'o 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
" "Rather than a progression from more to less violence in obtaining confessions, the history
of Anglo-American interrogation reveals that it has gravitated from one extreme to another . . . One
might think of it as a pendulum rather than a continuum." (P. 8.)
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Consider now the conventional story of the Fifth Amendment right against
compelled self-incrimination (admittedly oversimplified):
Once upon a time, there lived tyrannical governmental torturers who inflicted
severe pain on suspects to induce confessions. Over the years, increasingly
enlightened people occupying positions of power and responsibility came to
understand that torturing a suspect often produces inaccurate statements. Further,
such people appreciated the deeper truth that even when it gives us accurate
information, torture is a wrongful and barbaric way to treat anyone, guilty or
innocent. In response to such increasing moral maturity, professional police forces
developed and built their cases on the basis of evidence, embracing only those
confessions that resulted from professional interrogation practices rather than
compulsion. In time, we instituted even greater protection for the individual
suspect's autonomy in the form of the Miranda warnings, a crowning achievement
of the forces of progress that signaled a rejection of even mild psychological
coercion in the service of extracting confessions.12
In Confessions of Guilt, Thomas and Leo demonstrate convincingly that this
conventional story, what Steven Pinker, in The Better Angels of Our Nature, might
characterize as the overarching historical trend toward progress in the humane
exercise of power,' 3 does not apply to the history of interrogation. Rather than
participating in a forward march toward enlightenment, Thomas and Leo show us
that American confessions law has instead traveled in waves, ebbing and flowing
in its sensitivity to suspects' interests in response to events in the world. Like the
status of gun control, confessions law reflects the nation's perception 4 of itself as
secure or threatened, and that feeling is neither static nor steadily headed in only
one direction.
Driving their point home at the start of their introduction, Thomas and Leo
ask us to consider "two interrogations separated by the Atlantic Ocean and 170
12 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
' Although Pinker does not explicitly address the use of force in interrogation, he argues that
that humans have become less violent on a number of fronts, citing "the taming of chronic raiding
and feuding, the reduction of vicious interpersonal violence such as cutting off noses, the elimination
of cruel practices like human sacrifice, torture-executions, and flogging, the abolition of institutions
such as slavery and debt bondage, the falling out of fashion of blood sports and dueling, the eroding
of political murder and despotism, the recent decline of wars, pogroms, and genocides, the reduction
of violence against women, the decriminalization of homosexuality, [and] the protection of children
and animals." STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED
672 (2011). Though one might find merit in Pinker's claims about human interactions with other
humans, his claim that humans have increasingly protected nonhuman animals-a claim that requires
an unsupportable exemption for the astonishing violence entailed in humans' consumption of animal
products-is most charitably characterized as fanciful. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, A Clash of Justice
and Nonviolence, DORF ON LAW (Nov. 30, 2011, 6:30 AM),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/201 1/1I/clash-of-justice-and-nonviolence.html.
14 Thomas and Leo emphasize cultural forces and sentiments that go beyond just those
evidenced by actual crime rates. In the history of crime and crime control, often, "the numbers
matter less than the impression." (P. 115.)
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years." (P. 3.) They describe how, in 1832, an English magistrate examined a
murder suspect. The magistrate's clerk warned the prisoner, suspected of a "horrid
murder . . . that he was not bound to say anything to criminate himself," adding
that "anything he had to say 'would be taken down in writing, and, if necessary,
produced as evidence on his trial."' (P. 3.) Thomas and Leo then ask us to travel
forward in time to 2004. Just nine years ago, they remind us, the Pentagon issued
its approval for the use of "harsher interrogation procedures" for a terrorism
suspect held in the Guantanamo Bay prison camp. (P. 3.)15 These procedures
included water-boarding, which many of us regard as torture.
The contrast is startling, because we generally think of 1832 as a far less
enlightened time than the present. Yet, Thomas and Leo show us that what we
think of as modem enlightened "Miranda" consciousness appeared many years
before Ernesto Miranda won his case in the United States Supreme Court in
1966.18 And more soberingly, they remind us that our own government very
recently gave its stamp of approval to the use of coercive interrogation methods
amounting to torture and that the public, by reelecting George W. Bush to office,
indicated its own acquiescence in that choice.19 (P. 15.)
Thomas and Leo offer a picture of the body politic that resonates with what
we know of the individual human (and, for that matter, nonhuman) mind and body
as well. When we are at peace and feeling secure, we are disinclined to use
violence against others.20 We may even experience a sense of good will and
warmth toward those whom we encounter from other walks of life. When we feel
1s Quoting David Johnston & Thom Shanker, Pentagon Approved Intense Interrogation
Techniques for Sept. 11 Suspect at Guantdnamo, N.Y.TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A9.
16 See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Office of Legal Counsel, to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel of the CIA, Interrogation of al Qaeda
Operative (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-bybee2002.pdf
17 See, e.g., Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S.
Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 468, 504 (2007) (examining historical cases of water torture
and finding that "the United States has made it clear, in its courts, both civil and military, and before
the national legislature, that water torture, by whatever name it is known, is indeed torture, that its
infliction does indeed justify severe punishment, and that it is unacceptable conduct by a government
or its representatives."); David Stout, Holder Tells Senators Waterboarding is Torture, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/16holdercnd.html?_r-0 ("Addressing
the subject of torture at the military prison in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba, [during his confirmation
hearings, Eric] Holder told Senator Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont, the committee chairman,
'Waterboarding is torture.' It was so defined under the Spanish Inquisition and when used by the
Japanese in World War II, he said, and it remains so today.").
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 12-18, § 1021, 125
Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) (to be codified in scattered sections ofU.S. code).
20 See, e.g., ERVIN STAUB, THE ROOTs OF EVIL: THE ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE AND OTHER GROUP
VIOLENCE 38 (2002) ("The defense of the physical and psychological self are basic goals, but they
can be dormant for a person with a strong feeling of personal adequacy who lives under normal
(nonthreatening) conditions. People with a weaker sense of their physical safety or weak self-esteem
are easily threatened.").
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threatened, on the other hand, we secrete stress hormoneS21 and may feel a need to
erect boundaries between "us" and "them." 2 2 We also become increasingly willing
or even eager to use violence to protect ourselves from the perceived threat, and
that willingness grows (and empathy for the source of the threat correspondingly
shrinks) with the magnitude of the danger.23
In addition to telling a dynamic story of perceived threats and responses in the
law of confessions, Thomas and Leo also helpfully dispel myths about the
21 See Stress: Constant Stress Puts Your Health At Risk, MAYO CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/stress/SR0000l (last updated July II, 2013) ("When you
encounter perceived threats . .. your hypothalamus, a tiny region at the base of your brain, sets off an
alarm system in your body. Through a combination of nerve and hormonal signals, this system
prompts your adrenal glands, located atop your kidneys, to release a surge of hormones including
adrenaline and cortisol.").
22 See, e.g., GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE: UNABRIDGED 74 (1979) ("[I]n
a deep sense we are the values that we hold, we cannot help but defend them with pride and
affection, rejecting every group that opposes them."); HARVEY A. HORNSTEIN, CRUELTY AND
KINDNESS: ANEW LOOK AT AGGRESSION AND ALTRUISM 9, 13-30 (1976) (examining the "many ways
in which bonds of we and barriers of they are erected and eroded by social forces, causing the
occurrence of both human kindness and cruelty"); id. at 14 ("Real or imagined threats from them, can
enhance we-group solidarity. Indeed, it can even produce bonds where none existed."); Walter G.
Stephan & C. Lausanne Renfro, The Role of Threat in Intergroup Relations, in FROM PREJUDICE TO
INTERGROUP EMOTIONS: DIFFERENTIATED REACTIONS TO SOCIAL GROUPS 191 (Diane M. Mackie &
Eliot R. Smith eds., 2002) (discussing, within the framework of integrated threat theory, how threat
and fear work to create prejudices).
23 See Morgan Cloud, Quakers, Slaves and the Founders: Profiling to Save the Union, 73
Miss. L.J. 369, 373-74 (2003) ("[H]istory teaches that in the midst of crises-when the future course
of events remains unknown-those charged with preserving the nation will resort to drastic tactics
unacceptable in more placid and tranquil times . . . Those arguing in favor of abstractions like liberty
and freedom are unlikely to prevail with a populace facing more concrete threats, like invading
armies, civil war or weapons of mass destruction."). Thomas and Leo also quote this language
directly in their book. (P. 239.) See also Walter G. Stephan et al.,Intergroup Threat
Theory, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 43, 43 (Todd D. Nelson
ed., 2009) (discussing intergroup threat theory, where "an intergroup threat is experienced when
members of one group perceive that another group is in a position to cause them harm," and outlining
negative behavioral responses to intergroup threat, including aggression, discrimination, harassment,
retaliation, and sabotage); Tingyan Li & Yufang Zhao, Help Less or Help More-Perceived
Intergroup Threat and Out-Group Helping, 4 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. STUD. 90, 97 (2012) (presenting
research on the willingness of a group to help other groups where the other groups posed varying
degrees of threat and concluding that "intergroup threat not only promotes direct negative
consequences in terms of negative attitudes and negative behavior, but also engenders indirect
negative responses by attenuating prosocial actions toward out-group members."); Ifat Maoz & Clark
McCauley, Threat, Dehumanization, and Support for Retaliatory Aggressive Policies in Asymmetric
Conflict, 52 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 93, 94-95 (2008) (discussing studies following September 11 attacks
that showed a "link between threat perception and support for state action against vulnerable out-
groups"); Carol Gordon & Asher Arian, Threat and Decision Making, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 196,
212 (2001) (The authors propose that "when we feel very threatened, most of us tend to just react.
We do not sit down and think about it and rationally decide what to do-we just do something. This
reaction is physiologically reinforced by our 'fight or flight' reaction. But when we do not feel very
threatened, while our emotions play a role, there is more of a balance between them and our rational
selves, which is reflected in our policy choices.").
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24disappearance of torture at the end of the eighteenth century, as well as myths
about Miranda truly protecting suspects from coercive interrogation.25 These two
interventions in our collective mythology fall nicely within the primary aim of the
book: to teach us that the harshness of what we do to suspects has increased and
decreased and increased again over time in response to perceived threats. Torture
is not primitive ancient history, and Miranda likewise does not signal the end of
history.
As Thomas and Leo put it:
[T]he acceptance of harsh interrogation tactics is always rooted at least in
part in the changing perceptions of external and internal threats. When
these threats appeared high . . . torture and extreme forms of coercion
were used to get confessions . . . When threats to the established order
appeared low . .. almost any interrogation was viewed as too harsh. (P.
7.)
The authors provide numerous examples of the changing state of interrogation
law in England and in this country that support their thesis about the relationship
between perceived threats and the law of interrogation.
Thomas and Leo note, for example, that after the War of American
Independence ended, within the governing white population, young America did
not face a serious threat of internal upheaval.26 Unlike England, America also
lacked large cities and thus a large urban underclass in the late eighteenth
century.27 In this environment, the authors track a solicitude for the autonomy of
criminal defendants and a deep skepticism about confessions and the pressures that
might have motivated them.28
The authors offer "[a] representative sample" from "the Pennsylvania Justice
of the Peace: 'A confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope or the
torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape, where it is to be considered the
evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it, and therefore it is to be
rejected."' (P. 71.) They note that "[b]y 1842 at least three states-Arkansas,
Missouri, and New York-had . . . statutes that required magistrates to warn the
24 The authors discuss the "third degree" method of interrogation utilized into the twentieth
century as well as cases after the late-eighteenth century in which police utilized torture in
interrogations. (Pp. 112-45.)
25 For example, the Miranda suppression right does not protect individuals where the goal of
custodial interrogation is to obtain information to use outside of prosecution. (Pp. 190-218, 231-36.)
26 The authors argue that those who did not emigrate to Canada or Europe after the War of
American Independence were "united by a belief in the grand American experiment in democracy."
(P. 69.)
27 The authors call attention to the contrast between London's 1.4 million residents in 1815
and New York's 93,000 inhabitants in 1810. (P. 69.)
28 The authors note that judges of the era of the newly formed Bill of Rights were often
skeptical of confessions made by vulnerable suspects to powerful government actors. (P. 69.)
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accused of his right not to answer questions and his right to consult with counsel."
(P. 72.)
The authors describe the case of New York as instructive. In 1828, New York
created protective examination rules for people accused of crime who were to be
questioned by justices of the peace. 29 By the 1850s, however, the population of
New York had rapidly increased, along with crime, and the first New York police
force recognizable as such by modem standards had been established and had
supplanted magistrates as the primary interrogators of suspects. Police were
given no similar directive to warn suspects, and New York courts were "moving
toward a less skeptical view of confessions. The legislature of this era seemed
more concerned with crime control." (P. 86.)31
It was around this time that John Henry Wigmore gained influence in his
advocacy of the "rationalist approach" to interrogation. (Pp. 108, 88-89.)
Wigmore emphasized the importance of convicting guilty defendants and
downplayed the relevance of suspect autonomy to the criminal justice project.3 2
The only legitimate reason for suppressing a confession, by the lights of Wigmore
33
and some of his contemporaries, was the risk of a false confession. Pressuring a
suspect to answer questions truthfully was a positive good to be encouraged rather
29 The authors discuss the build-up to and eventual passage of 1828 act. (Pp. 78-85); see also
N.Y. REV. STAT. vol. II, ch. 2, tit. 2, §§ 14, 15 at 708 (1829) ("The magistrate shall then proceed to
examine the prisoner in relation to the offence charged. Such examination shall not be on oath; and
before it is commenced, the prisoner shall be informed of the charge made against him, and shall be
allowed a reasonable time to send for and advise with counsel. If desired by the person arrested, his
counsel may be present during the examination of the complainant and the witnesses on the part of
the prosecution, and during the examination of the prisoner. At the commencement of the
examination, the prisoner shall be informed by the magistrate, that he is at liberty to refuse to answer
any question that may be put to him."). The regime closely tracked the rules that John A. Graham
proposed in 1923 to guide a magistrate in addressing a suspect: "Ist. Prisoner, you are entitled to
counsel. 2nd. Your confession must be free and voluntary, without fear, threats, or promises. 3rd.
You are not bound to answer any question which may tend to criminate yourself. 4th. Whatever you
confess against yourself, may be made use of on your trial in aid of your conviction." (P. 82.) (citing
People v. Maxwell, I Wheeler 163 (N.Y. Crim. Recorder 1823)).
30 One police superintendent correctly testified to a police commission that "there [was] no
statute that ma[de] it the duty of the Police" to give warnings that were required of Magistrates. (Pp.
85-86.)
31 Citing Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Magistrates' Examinations, Police Interrogations, and
Miranda-Like Warnings in the Nineteenth Century, 81 TUL. L. REv. 777, 810-11 (2007).
32 "[C]ases were 'absurdities' to Wigmore because they exalted autonomy over the goal of
preventing false confessions while convicting guilty defendants." (quoting 1 WIGMORE, A TREATISE
ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 820, at 927 (1904 ed.)). (P. 88.)
3 The authors discuss "the ascendancy of Wigmore's theory that confessions should be
suppressed only when there is a fair risk that the interrogation might produce a false confession"
(citing State v. Sherman, 90 P. 981, 983 (Mont. 1907)) (Pp. 108-09.); see also WIGMORE, supra note
32 §§ 821, 822.
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than an evil to be prohibited.34 The U.S. Supreme Court, with the notable
exception of Bram v. United States, 5 approached confessions in a similarly
rationalist mode and generally found confessions to be admissible in the absence of
brute force.
The authors show us that state confessions law between the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century again reflected a similar change in values. (Pp. 93-
98.) For instance, in 1890, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that telling a
suspect that he had "better tell the truth" was an improper inducement. (P. 93.)36
But twenty years later, in 1910, the Michigan court distanced itself from the robust
autonomy talk of the 1890 case.37 (Pp. 93-94.) Likewise in California, the authors
show a major change from 1890, when the Supreme Court of the state suppressed a
confession that responded to a statement that it would be better for the suspect to
make a full disclosure. (P. 94.)38 By 1908, in contrast, a California court found a
confession admissible and affirmed a death sentence, notwithstanding substantial
pressure by the police on the suspect. (P. 94.)39 Changes in the law of other states
tell a similar tale: as crime rates rose at the turn of the nineteenth century, pressure
that previously would have appeared "undue" became acceptable and even
laudable. (Pp. 95-95.) And the authors tell us that "[o]ther than in Georgia ... we
found no cases after 1903 holding that an exhortation to tell the truth rendered a
confession inadmissible." (P. 101.)
The threat story gives us a very helpful lens through which to make sense of
retrograde changes in the law of interrogation: "[C]rime posed a much greater
threat in the early twentieth century than in the late eighteenth century." (P.
108.)40 On the harsh interrogation method known as "the third degree," the
34 The authors note that a Montana Court upheld a confession given after the chief of police
told the suspect "if a person told the truth, as a rule, he got out of it a whole lot easier than he would
by telling a lot of lies." (P. 110) (citing State v. Dixon, 260 P. 138 (Mont. 1927)); WIGMORE, supra
note 32, § 823.
3s Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (finding a confession involuntary where the
interrogator confronted a suspect, who was possibly stripped of his clothes, with a claim that a
witness had implicated the suspect in a murder). While this was "one of the quickest turns in doctrine
in the history of the law of confessions," the authors also note that Bram "fell into disuse" for seven
decades after it was decided. (Pp. 91-93.)
36 Quoting People v. McCullough, 45 N.W. 515, 517 (Mich. 1890).
3 The 1910 court distanced itself from its own earlier descriptions of the rights of suspects
during interrogations, stating that the earlier decision, taken "baldly and without explanation of
qualification," did "not accurately state the law." (Pp. 93-94.) (citing People v. Dunningan, 128
N.W. 180, 181 (Mich. 1910)).
38 Citing People v. Thompson, 84 Cal. 598, 605 (1890).
3 Citing People v. Siemsen, 153 Cal. 387, 392 (1908).
40 "Partly because of urbanization, partly because of immigration, partly because of
industrialization, Americans in [the post Civil War decades] were fearful. The nation was torn apart
by racial prejudice, its law-and-order fabric dangerously fraying. The immigrants, particularly those
who could not speak English and who frequented saloons, were perceived as the 'other.' Some
Italian immigrants brought with them organized crime . . . . The freed slaves were perceived, in many
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authors use news articles and cases to show that "police responded with the third
degree when they perceived that they were losing the 'war' against crime,
particularly in the large cities." (P. 123.) Further on this theme, "[a]s long as the
police were viewed as clever stalkers of guilty, dangerous criminals, the third
degree could be seen as a necessary strategy to protect Americans from crime and
deviance." (P. 123.)41
The Thomas and Leo story is fascinating and illuminating. It exposes us to
the fact that people who lived long before we did may nonetheless have had
"civilizing" lessons to teach us. It reminds us too that we are vulnerable to the
effects of threats and fear, not only as individuals but as a nation as well. The
authors predict convincingly that we will see further development in the law of
confessions that continues to be well-calibrated to our ongoing sense of security or
threat. (Pp. 219 - 39.) They elegantly demonstrate that the two separate and very
different tracks along which interrogation law currently travels-interrogation to
solve crimes and interrogation to disrupt terrorism-allow us to glimpse the truth
of their historical analysis in real time. Like any book well worth reading, this one
is interesting, humbling, and instructive.
Thomas and Leo conclude by urging us to video-record interrogations. (Pp.
220-23.) Such video-recordings, they argue, will keep courts (and the public)
conscious of what takes place during custodial interrogation. (P. 221.) Thomas
and Leo do not nurture any illusions that recording will put an end to coercion or
that it will prevent us from reacting to threats in the way that we have always
reacted to threats. What they say, however, is that the transparency that video-
recordings provide will help ensure that we do not allow interrogation practice to
get away from us. (P. 222.)42 That is, it will allow the democratic process to
constrain what might otherwise reflect the heightened sense of threat that naturally
accompanies the work of police officers who spend more time in the presence of
perpetrators than most of the rest of us do.43 This is sage advice, as transparency
states, as the 'other.' The stereotypes of blacks critical to their enslavement did not magically
disappear." (P. 116.)
41 The authors note that a 1926 Saturday Evening Post story stated that the use of force by
police was, "[r]aw work, but they had to do it." (P. 123.) (citing "The Third Degree," L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 1926 (referring to the Mar. 26, 1926 Saturday Evening Post story)).
42 The authors state that "[t]he beauty of recording is that the full picture is there for the judge
and jury to see, warts and all." (P. 222.)
43 Thomas and Leo note that, whether intentional or inadvertent, police sometimes introduce
missing" information to a suspect so that the suspect's final confession narrative is "capable of
persuading the key parties in the criminal justice system as the case goes forward." (P. 220.)
Therefore, the authors argue, videotaped confessions would allow the other actors in the criminal
justice system to review confessions for the subtle and not-so-subtle influences interrogators have on
their suspects' confessions.
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can help ensure a better fit between our values and the practices of the police who
serve and protect us.
Let us turn now from Thomas and Leo's narrative of interrogation and torture
back to the story with which I began this review: the story of the Newtown
shootings and gun control. In understanding this story, Thomas and Leo would, I
think, regard the public's sudden willingness to support gun control as confirming
their account of confessions law. When people feel threatened, as they do after a
school shooting, they naturally experience a greater willingness to cut back on the
individual's right to own firearms in the interest of protecting innocent children
and the public more generally.
When we consider the gun control analogy, an additional puzzle piece might
immediately leap to mind to help shed additional light on the confessions story:
not everyone reacts the same way to a school shooting (or to virtually anything
else). Perhaps most of us want to disarm potential shooters when we read about
the Newtown case, but some of us react in the way that the NRA did-by wanting
to arm ourselves and other law-abiding people to protect against the threat of
school shooters.45 In other words, some Americans feel most threatened in the
wake of a school shooting by the prospect of bad guys with guns attacking good
guys without guns. 46 From their perspective, it is the uneven distribution of guns
rather than the individual right to own firearms that makes us vulnerable to school
shootings.47
This reality-that people do not all experience threats in the same way-can
help explain why, as Thomas and Leo acknowledge, interrogation law does not
always neatly move in tandem with perceived threats. To take just one example,
crime rates were on the rise by 1966 when the Supreme Court decided Miranda v.
4 To be sure, coercion that would be unacceptable to the public might still occur outside of
the viewing range of the recording equipment, whether behind the camera, before the camera begins
rolling, or in segments deleted from the "tape" or its equivalent. Nonetheless, a routine practice of
recording the entirety of police-suspect interactions from the moment of arrest, combined with the
presence of police witnesses who may be unwilling to tolerate plain violations of recording
requirements, would likely serve to minimize this sort of "hidden" misconduct.
45 See LaPierre, supra note 5.
46 See, e.g., Piers Morgan Live: March 15, 2013 (CNN television broadcast Mar. 15, 2013),
available at http://piersmorgan.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/15/david-bossie-on-his-resistance-to-a-gun-
ban-theres-the-potential-for-you-to-be-armed-and-thats-what-stops-crimes/ (debating assault gun
weapons ban with David Bossie, who asserted, "If you disarm everyone in America, they do know
that you're not armed. That's the one fact that you can't get away from . .. There's no sign on your
back saying 'I'm armed.' There's the potential for you to be armed and that's what stops crimes.").
47 In its concise, bumper-sticker form, the argument is, "when guns are outlawed, only
outlaws will own guns." But Italian philosopher and jurist, Cesare Marchese di Beccaria, made the
same argument in his 1764 treatise, An Essay On Crimes and Punishments: "The laws of [false
utility] are those which forbid to wear arms, disarming those only who are not disposed to commit the
crime which the laws mean to prevent. Can it be supposed, that those who have the courage to
violate the most sacred laws of humanity, and the most important of the code, will respect the less
considerable and arbitrary injunctions, the violation of which is so easy, and of so little comparative
importance?" 124-25 (Stephen Gould trans., 1809).
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Arizona. Thomas and Leo note that "[i]n 1966, the FBI index crime rate was in the
midst of a decades-long sharp ascent." (P. 164.)48 Yet, despite the decision's
incomplete protection for suspects and the fact that it was subsequently whittled
away by an increasingly conservative Supreme Court, Miranda did initially
promise what was intended to be robust protection for suspects against the coercive
experience of custodial interrogation. How could that happen when the crime rate
was on the rise?
Thomas and Leo offer two separate accounts. In one, they suggest that
Miranda consisted primarily of lofty rhetoric and may ultimately have served to
facilitate the successful introduction of confessions rather than to protect suspects
against police overreaching.49 In the service of this argument, they show quite
effectively how some of the confessions that were admitted after Miranda might
possibly have failed a proper application of the Due Process confessions test that
had preceded that seemingly revolutionary case. (Pp. 210-12.) In this account of
Miranda, the decision may not actually be a high point at all but may simply have
amounted, perhaps unwittingly, to an instrument for making confessions more
uniformly admissible.o
In a second and perhaps inconsistent account, the authors contend that things
were not so bad in 1966:
By 1966, the stresses and strains that produced the third degree in
American law had moderated. The Depression had ended, the Second
World War was won, the 1950s were a calm decade, organized crime
was no longer on the ascendancy, America had become the world-
dominant military and economic power, and the Vietnam War had yet to
drain our self-confidence. (P. 175.)
There is something to be said for both of these alternative points of view.
Miranda did in fact accomplish far less than one might have expected, which may
explain why police officers are no longer especially hostile to it. Law enforcement
officials may now regard Miranda as their friend and some even supported its
continued existence when challenged in Dickerson v. United States. 5  And at the
48 Citing JUST. RESEARCH & STATS. Ass'N, CRIME & JUSTICE ATLAS 2000 36-39 (2000).
49 The authors show, for example, that prosecutors can use and have used Miranda waivers
"offensively" against claims of involuntariness. (Pp. 210-12.)
50 "If the goal was to make it easier to show that suspects consented to the interrogation, and
thus gave 'voluntary' statements, then, yes, it succeeded admirably in the large universe of cases-
roughly 80/-where suspects waive their rights." (P. 176.) (citing Paul G. Cassell & Bret S.
Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA
L. REv. 839, 859 (1996) and Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 (1996))).
s' 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Former Attorney General Griffin Bell and other law enforcement
officials filed an amicus brief in the case arguing that Miranda "promotes effective law enforcement"
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same time, one can find ways of characterizing 1966 as a tranquil time relative to
other times in our history.
Yet such efforts to downplay the importance of Miranda, as well as the
perceived threat of crime at the time, may miss something significant. First, at
least as understood by its dissenting justices, Miranda looked-in 1966-like a
decision that would pose a serious obstacle to the successful interrogation of
suspects. Thomas and Leo themselves take note of Justice White's dissent, which
stated alarmingly:
In some unknown number of cases the Court's rule will return a killer, a
rapist or other criminal to the streets and to the environment which
produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him. As a
consequence, there will not be a gain, but a loss, in human dignity. (P.
164.)S2
These are not the words of a justice who perceives his colleagues in the
majority to be handing a new tool to law enforcement. The Miranda majority
itself understood the ruling as likely to create a burden for law enforcement,
acknowledging that, in fulfilling its duty to "shoulder the entire load," the
government must "produce the evidence against [an individual] by its own
independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it
from his own mouth."53
From the point of view of the justices, then, Miranda was not going to
facilitate the easy introduction of compelled statements but might instead make it
more difficult to obtain even voluntary confessions. As Thomas and Leo observe,
"the police chief of Los Angeles . . . predict[ed] that Miranda 'would effectively
end the use of confessions in convicting criminals."' (P. 165.) Police chiefs
around the country condemned the decision as "a shield for the guilty." (P. 165.)
"In sum," as Thomas and Leo put it, "in the fall of 1966, the police felt outgunned
and abandoned by the Supreme Court." (P. 165.)
But if the populace and law enforcement authorities around the country were
indeed feeling threatened in 1966, and if the Supreme Court really did attempt to
move interrogation law in a pro-autonomy direction, even at the risk-highlighted
by the dissenting justices-of preventing police from effectively combating crime,
by providing a bright line rule for police officers to follow. Brief of Griffin B. Bell, et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Dickerson v. United States 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525).
52 Quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542-43 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
" Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 ("To maintain a 'fair state-individual balance,' to require the
government 'to shoulder the entire load,' to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our
accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual
produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple
expedient of compelling it from his own mouth." (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMoN LAW § 2251, at 317 (McNaughton rev. 1961))).
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how can we explain this development, consistent with Thomas and Leo's
otherwise persuasive thesis?
I would suggest that the Newtown story can help us answer that question. We
do not all uniformly find the same things threatening, and we do not all respond in
exactly the same way to perceived threats. Many of us feel threatened by high
crime rates and want the police to respond to that threat by locking up the
perpetrators, whatever it takes. Others, however, feel most threatened by the
prospect of police harassment, false imprisonment, and potential brutality behind
closed doors.
When police become desperate to identify perpetrators-something that
understandably occurs during a spike in crime rates or after a particularly highly
publicized or iconic violent crime (such as the rape of the Central Park Jogger in
1989) 54-police may be motivated to turn up the dial on interrogation practices. In
these circumstances, those who ordinarily fear the police may become especially
fearful of the government. One might therefore expect to see dissenting voices, in
the public at large and occasionally on the Supreme Court, identifying with those
who are most frightened of the police rather than of the criminals. Just as one
might see more "good guys with guns" as the solution to school shootings,55 one
might come to see coercive interrogation tactics as a threat to safety and security
rather than as an effective way of reducing the threat of violent crime.
When I teach my course in constitutional criminal procedure, I begin the
semester by asking my students what would happen if there were no police to
enforce the laws against violent predation. In that event, a student will point out,
violent and rapacious criminals would run rampant, leaving the law-abiding public
to cower behind closed doors, feeling terrified. Then I ask what would happen if
there were no limits on what the police could do to enforce the criminal law.
Another student will observe that we would then have a police state in which
people are reluctant to leave their homes for fear of being accosted or brutalized by
the police, accused of fabricated misdeeds, and deprived of their liberty or worse.
In both scenarios, we have uncontrolled violence, chaos, insecurity, and a loss of
freedom of movement. Having the benefit of both police and constitutional limits
on those police helps provide checks and balances so that neither private crime nor
official abuse unduly interferes with the individual's security and freedom.
Thomas and Leo hint at the complex nature of threats at various points in their
discussion of "deviance," in referring to police conduct that the public finds
reprehensible. For the most part, the authors emphasize how criminal misbehavior,
terrorism, or other perceived internal or external threats to Americans (including
supernatural threats posed by "witches" (Pp. 67-68.)) give rise to a greater
willingness to tolerate harsh methods of interrogation thought necessary to
54 See THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE (Florentine Films 2012).
5 See LaPierre, supra note 5.
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neutralize the threats.56 On occasion, however, the authors recognize that like
crime, official practices too can cause the public to feel threatened, and can
accordingly lead to opposition and a concomitant push to rein in law enforcement
excess. 57
For example, the authors say that the "third degree" fell into disrepute and
disuse because it eventually came to be "recognized as its own form of deviance."
(P. 121 .)58 Thomas and Leo similarly characterize the U.S. Supreme Court's
discussion of harsh interrogation tactics in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, a 1944
decision. 9 The Court there refers to "foreign nations with ... governments which
convict individuals with testimony obtained by police organizations possessed of
an unrestrained power.... So long as the Constitution remains the basic law of our
Republic, America will not have that kind of government." (P. 153.) As Thomas
and Leo aptly describe the implication of this statement, "[t]he Ashcraft Court is
asking the state courts, what's the trouble of a few unsolved murders if the
alternative is a regime like Nazi Germany?" (P. 153.)
In these cases, Thomas and Leo depart somewhat from their usual frame of
correlating harsh interrogation with perceived threats from crime or external
enemies. Rather than saying simply that crime levels dropped and therefore
reduced the perceived need for harsh interrogation methods, they suggest instead
that the police behavior itself came to play a role similar to private crime in
eliciting a public outcry and judicial steps to curb the abuse, separate from criminal
trends.o In general, however, Thomas and Leo stick to the compelling story of
interrogation practices as a reflection of the public's insecurity in the face of
threats posed by someone other than the police themselves.
Thomas and Leo are generally right to stay with that story. In a democracy
such as ours, the ordinary course of events is for police conduct to respond, more
or less, to public sentiment. When the public becomes more fearful of crime, as it
has at various points in our history, the police react by "cracking down" on
suspected criminals, a crackdown that can include harsh or otherwise troubling
56 These harsh interrogation tactics were not limited to suspects. The authors note that in the
early nineteenth century, in serious criminal cases, law enforcement officials would often hold
material witnesses in custody and put them into "sweat boxes" to elicit evidence. (P. 122.)
57 "[P]olice responded with the third degree when they perceived that they were losing the
'war' against crime, particularly in the large cities, and . . . police turned away from the third degree
when the public began to perceive their conduct as deviant." (P. 123.)
58 The authors partially attribute the fall of "third degree" tactics to public outcry and legal
actions in the early 1930's, which left police departments "stung ... by the depictions of police as
corrupt thugs." (P. 138.)
5 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
60 The severity of police tactics, alone, however, does not provide the whole story about what
led to reform. For example, the authors draw attention to how people's perception of police tactics
changed in an historical era in which public awareness of "the evils of fascism" probably contributed
to police departments' respective decisions to try to improve their own image by reducing the use of
third degree tactics. (P. 139.)
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interrogation methods that culminate in rapid and viscerally satisfying
convictions.6 1 When this happens, suspects suffer both an increased probability of
false convictions and the cruelty and harassment that accompany a failure of
empathy in the face of those who are feared and regarded as the enemy.
By the same token, when people generally feel safe from crime and other
threats, they do not clamor for "law and order" in quite the same way, and police
find themselves under correspondingly less pressure to produce results quickly and
dramatically. In such times, police are less likely to feel the desperation that fuels
abusive interrogation practices, and the public is likewise more inclined to
sympathize with suspected criminals and extend humane treatment to them.
This story is a good one, and it is far more sophisticated and sensitive to the
facts of our history than the conventional narrative of steady progress toward the
autonomous and dignified suspect protected by Miranda from police overreaching.
Still, the story is incomplete and unnecessarily loses some of its appealing
explanatory power when crime rates increase but the law of confessions remains
reasonable or even moves toward greater restraint. A fuller appreciation for the
nature of threats, however, can fill in this missing piece and add power to the
Thomas/Leo thesis. The journey of interrogation law reflects the ebb and flow of
threats, both internal and external, and including the threat of official overreaching
itself. Like our friends and neighbors, the police are human beings, with the same
strengths and weaknesses as the rest of us.
When crime rates rise, or when terrorists threaten our lives, most of us look to
our government to use force to protect us from those threats. In such times,
interrogation is likely to become harsher and less solicitous of the needs and
interests of suspects.62 But even (and maybe even especially) in those terrifying
times, there are those who will remain most frightened of the police, whether they
fall into minority groups that comprise "the usual suspects" or whether they are
simply naturally inclined to fear government more than private individuals. People
drawn to membership in the American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU] provide one
example, on the left side of the political spectrum. And occasionally it is those
individuals and the people who empathize with them-people like Justices
William 0. Douglas and Thurgood Marshall-who help craft the legal response to
police practices.
61 See THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE, supra note 54.
62 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
63 See, e.g., the ACLU's arguments against an increase in police presence in and police
resources dedicated to American communities. The Militarization of Police in America: Towns
Don't Need Tanks, available at http://www.aclu.org/militarization (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
6 Justice Marshall joined Justice Douglas' dissent in Laird v. Tatum, where the Court
dismissed for lack of ripeness of a plaintiff's claim that the U.S. Army was conducting unlawful
surveillance of lawful activity. 408 U.S. I (1972). Justice Douglas argues that, "[t]he Constitution
was designed to keep government off the backs of the people." Id. at 28 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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When crime or other such threats emerge, the law governing police
interrogation is likely to be less robust than it would be in a time of relative safety
and security. And this fact can help explain the holes in Miranda that Thomas and
Leo do an excellent job of exposing. Likewise, in times of safety from threats, the
people naturally inclined to fear the government can join hands with those who
feel unthreatened by and therefore favorably inclined toward people suspected of
criminal deviance, and together urge the provision of protection against police
abuse.
In my amended version, the Thomas and Leo story of interrogation law thus
becomes a somewhat more complex story, one in which the dominant group
identifies with the government and usually gets its way, whether that means harsh
interrogation for perceived threats or humane interrogation for the underdog during
calm periods. In this story, however, there is a real-time countercurrent in those
who feel most threatened by the government itself and whose analogue to a
majority's desire for harsh interrogation methods is a desire for strict limits on
what the police may do in the service of law and order. And sometimes, the
countercurrent prevails. 65
65 In his dissent in Miranda, Justice John M. Harlan decried the new limits on police
interrogation: "the thrust of the new rules is to negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous or
ignorant suspect, and ultimately to discourage any confession at all." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 505 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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